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ABSTRACT 
 
Grassroots Organizing Work (GROW) 
(Under the Directino of William Sturkey) 
 
 
This paper examines an interracial labor organizing project in the Southern pulpwood 
processing industry. The project was organized by two white former members of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in response to the organization’s directive that 
white activists conduct antiracist organizing in white communities. It was ultimately funded 
by the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF). GROW’s strategy was to convince 
poor white Southerners of their common interests with black Southerners through labor 
organizing and, in turn, to transform their racial attitudes. Due to the successes of the classical 
civil rights movement, including the Voting Rights and Civil Rights Acts, as well as the 
mobilization of white antiracist activists, the project succeeded in building interracial 
coalitions and winning modest gains for pulpwood haulers. This paper joins existing 1970s 
labor and New Left historiography while also interrogating the historiography of civil rights 
unionism and interracial coalition building in the Deep South. 
 
  
 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................1 
 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................47 
 
WORKS CITED ..........................................................................................................................50  
 
 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On a late September evening in 1971, over one hundred black and white Mississippians 
packed the Jones County courthouse in Laurel, Mississippi. This group, including alleged former 
Klansmen, came to hear the state’s former field secretary for the NAACP, Charles Evers. Evers 
was running as an independent in the governor’s race in November, and this audience was a 
potential bloc of voters.1 Evenly divided among white and black, most in the audience belonged 
to a Mississippi contingent of the Gulfcoast Pulpwood Association (GPA), a four-year-old 
interracial organization of pulpwood cutters in the Deep South. “Our white brothers and black 
brothers realize that we’ve all got to run together,” Evers solemnly stated, “or we’re all going to 
sink together.” The whole courtroom stood to applaud.2 
The NAACP earned the GPA’s enthusiastic support once it began to offer monetary aid 
to the Association, which had been on strike since the beginning of September.3 After the strike 
                                                           
1 Charles Evers rose to fame in the South after the murder of his brother, Medgar Evers, who was field secretary for 
the Mississippi NAACP. As Emilye Crosby has argued, Charles Evers exploited his brother’s civil rights notoriety 
to launch a career in Southern politics and consistently “used local movements as a platform for consolidating his 
personal power and influence.” Evers’ run for Mississippi governor in 1971 is certainly an extension of this 
opportunistic maneuvering. This does not, however, detract from the enthusiasm the white woodcutters had for his 
campaign and his calls for interracial unity. Emilye Crosby, “‘God’s Appointed Savior:’ Charles Evers’s Use of 
Local Movements for National Stature,” in Groundwork: Local Black Freedom Movements in America, ed. Jeanne 
Theoharis, Komozi Woodward, and Charles M. Payne, 165-192 (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 
167.  
2 Roy Reed, “Mississippi Whites Join Blacks to Listen to Evers at Labor Rally,” The New York Times, September 
24, 1971, 47. 
3 Denton L. Watson, “Miracle in Mississippi: NAACP Relief Fund,” The Crisis, April 1972, 115; Sue DeLoach, 
“Woodcutters Get NAACP Aid Here,” Laurel Leader-Call, October 19, 1971, 1; Mississippi Woodcutters Strike,” 
The Southern Patriot, October 1971, 1, 8. 
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began, Evers joined Bob Zellner, a white former member of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), James Simmons, a white woodcutter and then GPA President, 
and two other woodcutters (one black and one white) on a trip to Washington, D.C. to petition 
more food stamps for the strikers.4 While the NAACP had only recently begun advocating for 
the striking pulpwood cutters, Zellner had been organizing workers in the paper and pulp 
industries for four years.  
Between 1966 and 1980, Zellner and other activists of the Southern Conference 
Educational Fund (SCEF) orchestrated Grass Roots Organizing Work (GROW).5 GROW’s 
purpose was to demonstrate to working-class white Southerners that their best interests lay not in 
a racial alliance with white bosses and factory owners, but in an interracial coalition of working 
people.6 While the project’s headquarters were in New Orleans, its goal was to work directly 
with local working-class white communities. The first step, according to the GROW proposal: 
“to show [these communities] that by unifying the particular segment of the white community 
some changes in their lives are possible. The next step will naturally be to show that if the black 
and white communities unite, more substantial changes can follow.”7 After hearing from another 
civil rights activist about a “crisis situation” facing the International Woodworkers of America 
                                                           
4 “Mississippi Woodcutters Strike,” The Southern Patriot, October 1971, 1, 8. 
5 Linda Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense: The Southern Conference Movement 1938-1962 (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1991). SCEF, founded in 1938 as the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW), 
was dedicated to using interracial labor organizing to creating a coalition of black and white Southerners to fight 
poverty and racism.  
6 Bob and Dorothy Zellner, “A Proposal of the Southern Conference Education Fund,” Box 1, Folder 1, Bob Zellner 
Papers 1960-2009, The Wisconsin Historical Society Archives (HSW). 
7 “GROW Proposal,” n.d., Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers 1959-1972, (Sanford N.C: 
Microfilming Corp of America, 1981), Reel 21-231. 
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(IWA) Local 5-443 in Laurel, Mississippi, Zellner and GROW decided on the city for its pilot 
project.8 
This thesis analyzes GROW’s Mississippi-based labor organizing during the late-1960s 
and early-1970s. By doing so, it interrogates existing scholarly assumptions regarding the 
character and limitations of this “classical” civil rights movement.9 Since the late 1980s, 
historians have focused on instances of interracial, working-class-oriented civil rights activism 
prior to the classical movement.10 Studying the Communist Party, labor unions, and the working 
class orientation of groups such as the NAACP, these scholars have highlighted the ties between 
civil rights activism and economic and labor rights in this period. While some have covered this 
phenomenon in Deep South states such as Alabama and Georgia, many of these studies are 
centered on Northern cities or Upper South states, such as New York City, Chicago, Detroit, and 
North Carolina.11 Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s 2005 historiographical article synthesized this 
                                                           
8 Bob and Dorothy Zellner, “Grass Roots Organizing Work: A Program for the White South,” The Southern Patriot, 
September 1967, 2. 
9 This thesis employs Baynard Rustin’s terming of the civil rights movement from 1954-1964 as the “classical” 
movement. Bayard Rustin, “From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement,” Commentary, 
February, 1965, republished on www.crmvet.org. 
 
10 Historians who have covered working-class-oriented civil rights organizing in the 1930s and 1940s include, for 
example, Robert Korstad, “Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement,” 
The Journal of American History 75, no. 3 (December 1988); Robin D. G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama 
Communists During the Great Depression, Twenty-Fifth Anniversary ed. (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015); Martha 
Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2004); Glenda Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights 1919-1950 (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2009); Erik Gellman, Death Blow to Jim Crow: The National Negro Congress and the Rise of 
Militant Civil Rights (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Risa Goluboff, The Lost Promise of 
Civil Rights (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2010); Nelson Lichtenstein, “Recasting the Movement and 
Reframing the Law in Risa Goluboff’s The Lost Promise of Civil Rights,” Law & Social Inquiry 35, no. 1 (Winter, 
2010).  
 
11 Biondi’s and Gellman’s studies focus, respectively, on organizing New York City and Chicago, while Korstad 
focuses his work on unions in Detroit and North Carolina.    
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historiographical current as “The Long Civil Rights Movement.”12 Writing in decades that 
witnessed the failures of school integration, racist policing, mass incarceration, and continuing 
educational and wealth inequalities, scholars have lamented the ultimate shape which the 
classical movement took. Disheartened by these trends, they have argued that, had it been able to 
continue, the working-class-oriented civil rights activism of the 1930s and 1940s would have 
offered a more comprehensive and ultimately meaningful change than the push for voting rights 
and desegregation of the 1950s and 1960s.  
By highlighting how race relations in labor activism changed after the two decades of the 
classical movement, this study of coalition-based, working-class civil rights activism in 1970s 
Mississippi complicates this body of scholarship by examining interracial labor organizing in the 
years after the demise of formal Jim Crow laws. The success of labor organizing in this latter 
period was limited, as this study will show, by the uncertain nature of work in the wood 
processing industry, anti-union laws, and the 1973 global recession. However, the coalitional 
organizing done through GROW in the working-class Deep South—made possible by the 
classical movement of the 1950s and 1960s—was in many ways unprecedented in the period 
following Reconstruction. Before labor unions and public spaces were forcefully integrated and 
voting rights protected, convincing white and black workers to join forces was simply not a 
viable organizing strategy in the Deep South. Likewise, the relative social, economic, and 
political power that white workers had over their black counterparts during the reign of Jim 
Crow inherently made the internal power dynamics of any kind of interracial coalition 
building—if at all possible —drastically imbalanced.13 Juxtaposed with existing studies of 
                                                           
12 Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” The Journal of 
American History 91, no. 4 (March 2005). 
13 William P. Jones has noted in his study of African American workers in the Southern lumber industry how 
organized labor believed that “unions could survive in the Jim Crow South only by remaining neutral on the 
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interracial organizing in the 1930s and 1940s, GROW’s later context offers insight into the way 
that inter-working-class racial power dynamics shape labor-based coalitions.  
Civil rights activists of the 1950s and 1960s achieved significant legislative and social 
changes in Mississippi and across the United States. By breaking through what historian John 
Dittmer calls Mississippi’s “systemic and pervasive” fortress of white violence and intimidation 
and forcing the passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, the 
classical movement dramatically shifted the racial power dynamics in Southern labor activism.14 
By the late 1960s, unions and factories were desegregating, black workers could vote, and white 
civil rights activists were dedicated to conducting antiracist organizing in poor white 
communities. After spending years working within the black community in Mississippi, these 
white activists were convinced that to end the devastating economic effects of Jim Crow across 
racial boundaries, they had to convert white working-class Southerners from their racist beliefs. 
In 1966, white members were expelled from SNCC after years of debate surrounding their role in 
the movement, propelling two of them to initiate GROW through SCEF. The interracial political 
and labor alliances they were able to facilitate through GROW were dependent on the shift in 
power towards the black community. It follows that these changes to the region’s racial 
“fortress” were necessary for egalitarian working-class, interracial civil rights organizing to 
emerge in the South.  
Taking into account the classical movement is also essential for appreciating the 
perspectives of white activists in this period. SCEF, under which the GROW project operated, 
                                                           
question of racial inequality.” Even though the demand for labor during WWII gave black lumber workers in the 
South more sway in their unions, white workers continued to push back against interracial unionization, black 
leadership in unions, and support for civil rights. William P. Jones, The Tribe of Black Ulysses: African American 
Lumber Workers in the Jim Crow South (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 167.  
14 John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana-Champagne: University of 
Illinois Press, 1995), 423. 
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had been a part of the interracial Southern civil rights activism of the Depression years. Studies 
of the organization have focused almost exclusively on these decades before the classical 
movement, going only so far as 1963.15 Silenced by the Red Scare during the height of the 
classical movement, by the late 1960s and 1970s the organization had not greatly altered its 
original mission. GROW, and many of its other projects, remained dedicated to establishing an 
interracial coalition of radical Southerners.  
While SCEF was forced under the radar of Cold War anticommunist paranoia, though, 
future GROW organizers were being trained in the classical civil rights movement. Particularly 
through their time in SNCC, white activists learned strategies for connecting with, persuading, 
and organizing mostly working-class African-Americans in the racially hostile Deep South. 
Their awareness, however imperfect, of the relationship between race and class, their dedication 
to stimulating grassroots black leadership, and their newly honed organizing skills were products 
not of the 1930s and 1940s, but of the 1950s and 1960s.  
By the late 1960s, many civil rights organizations had shifted their attention towards 
economic inequality and poverty that still haunted the country. Scholars of the intersection 
between labor and civil rights activism after the classical movement have highlighted this trend. 
They have looked at such subjects as Martin Luther King Jr.’s role in the Memphis sanitation 
workers strike, the relationship between civil rights activism and War on Poverty programs, and 
                                                           
15 Scholars who have outlined SCEF’s work include Linda Reed, Simple Decency & Common Sense; Irwin 
Klibaner, Conscience of a Troubled South: The Southern Conference Educational Funder, 1946-1966 (Brooklyn: 
Carlson Publishing Inc., 1989); Catherine Fosl, Subversive Southerner: Anne Braden and the Struggle for Racial 
Justice in the Cold War South (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); and Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race 
and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2014). In her biography of longtime SCEF field 
organizer and Executive Director Anne Braden, Fosl briefly touches on SCEF’s organizing projects in the white 
community from the late 1960s onward. 
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civil rights work within grassroots labor unions.16 While GROW organizers asserted in 1967 that 
“Agreement [was] widespread within the civil rights movement on the necessity of organizing in 
the white community, especially in the southern white community,” interracial labor organizing 
dedicated to converting white Southerners to civil rights causes has not been critically analyzed 
by historians.17 These white activists were motivated by the period’s general redirection towards 
issues of poverty, as well as the insistence of their frustrated black co-activists that their role lie 
in organizing the white community against racism. Thus, GROW activists of the late 1960s and 
1970s were singularly dedicated to organizing white rank and file working-class Southerners in 
their simultaneous fight against racial and class inequalities. I argue that, after the classical civil 
rights movement, they were able to facilitate interracial alliances by capitalizing on white 
working-class laborers’ new dependence on African-American votes, union support, and 
assertiveness.  
Comparing the outcomes of the working-class orientation of 1930s and 1940s civil rights 
efforts to GROW in the 1970s is complicated, considering the difference between the economies 
of the 1940s and the 1970s. In the 1940s, laborers were essential to the industrial American 
economy, and the reinvigorated post-WWII Red Scare had not yet decimated union power and 
Communist influence. Likewise, this was a period before the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 spurred a 
slew of states, particularly in the South, to pass “Right to Work” legislation that deeply 
                                                           
16 Michael Honey, Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther King’s Last Stand (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 2007); Dittmer, Local People; Susan Ashmore, Carry It On: The War on Poverty and 
the Civil Rights Movement in Alabama (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008); Crystal R. Sanders, A Chance 
for Change: Head Start and Mississippi’s Black Freedom Struggle (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2016); Robert R. 
Korstad and James L. Leloudis, To Right These Wrongs: The North Carolina Fund and The Battle to End Poverty 
and Inequality in 1960s America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010); and Kieran Walsh 
Taylor, “Turn to the Working Class: The New Left, Black Liberation, and the U.S. Labor Movement (1967-1981),” 
(PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007).  
17 “GROW Proposal,” SNCC Papers 1959-1972. 
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hampered union power and membership. Labor unions during this period had a great deal of 
power in politics, and black workers had unprecedented leverage as wartime industrial laborers 
and untapped Communist Party recruits. New Deal and wartime rhetoric of equality and liberty 
armed activists in their push for civil rights and equal employment opportunities for African-
Americans.  
By contrast, scholars have established the 1970s as a period in which labor and civil 
rights groups struggled to cement their bases and identify their goals. Scholar of the Mississippi 
civil rights movement, Charles M. Payne, for example, has called this process the “the 
Demoralization of the Movement,” while labor scholar Jefferson Cowie described the 1970s as 
“the Last Days of the Working Class.”18 As this thesis acknowledges, SCEF and its organizing 
projects were not immune to conflicts and uncertainty that plagued both labor and civil rights 
activism in this period. Moreover, in the Deep South specifically, as GROW activists explained, 
by the 1970s white workers such as those at Laurel’s Masonite hardboard factory “had been so 
long misled by racists and neglected by the whites working in the Civil Rights Movement.”19  
Despite these obstacles, the organizing in Laurel ultimately inspired white workers in one 
of the most racially violent regions of Mississippi to run a mayoral campaign on a racially 
integrated, anti-discrimination platform, motivated a series of impactful interracial woodcutter 
associations across the Deep South, and culminated in a working-class, interracial voting bloc for 
the first black gubernatorial candidate the state had seen since its founding.20 While the GPA 
                                                           
18 Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York: The New Press, 
2010); Charles Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom 
Struggle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 338. 
 
19 Robert Analavage, “Black and white Divided: Laurel Strike is Broken,” The Southern Patriot, January 1968, 4. 
20 James T. Wooten, “Mississippi ‘Loyalist’ Democrats Nominate Evers for Governor,” The New York Times, April 
19, 1971, 1.  
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ultimately struggled to defend workers’ rights in an evolving and historically exploitative 
industry, the political and labor coalitions which GROW facilitated should not be neglected 
because of that. Instead, it is more useful to identify what made this previously unthinkable 
interracial working-class coalition possible in states such as Mississippi and Alabama. 
Understanding this shift is necessary for a more precise understanding of the ultimate decline of 
organized labor in the late twentieth century and the endurance of racial and economic 
inequality.21  
 By the 1970s, pulp and paper products was one of Mississippi’s—and the South’s—
largest industries, both in terms of manufacturing sector employment and economic value added 
to the state. After New Deal reforestation projects developed sustainable methods for growing 
Southern pine, then used to produce brown papers and newsprint, traditionally transient wood 
products companies moved to the South for the long term. Despite being one of the few 
industries in which black Southerners could work, these outside firms established themselves in 
the region by accommodating and exploiting Southern racial and class hierarchies on the factory 
floor and through their intricately hierarchical and exploitative wood procurement systems.22  
 Thus, the Southern wood processing industry demonstrates how racial inequality among 
workers limited opportunities for interracial organizing. Historian Timothy Minchin and legal 
scholar William Boyd have produced intensive studies of unionism in the papermaking industry, 
                                                           
21 Lane Windham has similarly argued that labor scholars need to take more seriously how the influx of women and 
non-white people into unions as a result of the Civil Right Act “complicates common narratives for labor’s decline.” 
Lane Windham, Knocking on Labor’s Door: Union Organizing in the 1970s and the Roots of a New Economic 
Divide (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2017), 7.  
 
22 John C. Bliss and Warren A. Flick, “With a Saw and a Truck: Alabama Pulpwood Producers,” Forest & 
Conservation History 38, no. 2 (April 1994), 79-89; Warren A. Flick, “The Wood Dealer System in Mississippi: An 
Essay on Regional Economics and Culture,” Journal of Forest History 29, no. 3 (July 1985), 131-138; William 
Boyd, The Slain Wood: Papermaking and Its Environmental Consequences in the American South (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2015). 
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offering valuable insights into the broader wood processing industry to which Masonite 
belonged.  At first glance, the field seems progressive relative to its segregated, un-unionized 
peers. Employing nearly 700,000 workers by the 1960s, paper mills had since the 1930s allowed 
African-Americans to work in their shops, unlike most other industries in the region. Because the 
industry was based in remote, rural regions, paper companies were willing to pay unionized 
workers higher wages to fill their nascent factories and keep their capital-intensive plants 
running at full capacity.23 This was true of the IWA Local in Laurel as well, which had existed 
since at least the late 1940s.24 Unionization and pay was therefore relatively high.25 Yet, as 
Minchin demonstrates, the concept of civil rights unionism collapses when studying this type of 
work.26 In response to the high number of black workers in the field, unions like Local 5-443 and 
others in the paper industry began and remained strictly segregated.  
 The establishment of separate seniority systems, segregated unions, and management 
which benefited from a divided workforce, African-Americans in wood processing industries 
were left to the most labor intensive, lowest paying, and most dangerous positions. Managers and 
unions reserved the best jobs exclusively for white workers and upward mobility on the factory 
floor was virtually impossible for African-Americans.27 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave black 
workers the legal power to fight these inequalities, and they forcefully did so. Yet, the violent 
                                                           
23 Timothy J. Minchin, The Color of Work: The Struggle for Civil Rights in the Southern Paper Industry, 1945-1980 
(Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2001), 13; William Boyd, The Slain Wood: Papermaking and Its Environmental 
Consequences in the American South (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015). 
24 Letter from J.D. Jolly to Mr. J. L. Baughman, 5 June, 1961, Box 9, Folder 5443 Laurel, MS, International 
Woodworkers of America, Southern States records, 1940s-1980s, Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State 
University, Atlanta (hereafter GSU). 
25 Minchin, The Color of Work, 13. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, 19. 
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pushback they received from their fellow white employees—in the form of Klan violence and 
shop floor harassment—as well as noncompliance by companies themselves, stalled the 
integration process.28 As historian Robert J. Norrell explains, Southern labor unions became 
“bastions of segregationist feeling” during the period of massive resistance against civil rights 
activism of the 1950s and 1960s.29  The increased mechanization of these industries in the 1960s 
and 1970s also meant that at precisely the moment black workers won access to better jobs, these 
jobs began to dwindle.  
 To supply Southern wood processing mills, around an additional 150,000 black and white 
Southerners in the 1960s and 1970s labored hauling pulpwood.30 Unlike factory workers, 
woodcutters operated in small, independent teams of loggers, making unionization logistically 
difficult. Dominated by mills that contracted wood procurement out to “wood dealers,” the wood 
products industry left the harvesters of this wood, or “pulpwood producers,” at the bottom of a 
three-part hierarchy.31 As Boyd explains, “By maintaining an ‘arm’s-length’ relationship 
between the company and the loggers, the contract-based system insulated the mills from many 
of the risks and liabilities associated with logging…For those at the bottom of the hierarchy, 
economic insecurity was a way of life.”32 Because of the producers’ dependency on dealers, 
recruited from local white small business owners, as well as the geographical segmentation of 
                                                           
28 Ibid.  
29 Robert J. Norell, “Labor Trouble: George Wallace and Union Politics in Alabama,” in Organized Labor in the 
Twentieth-Century South, ed. Robert H. Ziegler, 250-272 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1992), 
257.  
30 Wayne Greenhaw, “Woodcutter’s Organize: Echoes of Change in the South’s Backwoods,” Southern Changes: 
The Journal of the Southern Regional Council 3, No. 1, 1980, 16-19, 22; Boyd, The Slain Wood,101. 
31 Boyd, The Slain Wood, 54. 
32 Boyd, The Slain Wood, 54, 55. 
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the labor market, the development of producer associations was intermittent and weak at best.33 
As a result, the pay of woodcutters was far lower than factory workers, averaging less than $100 
per week in the 1970s.34 Woodcutters generally took home around $3,000 per year for labor 
intensive work that posed a constant risk of injury or death from falling wood, shoddy 
equipment, and hiding rattlesnakes.35 The job was also marked by consistent debt to wood 
dealers, inconsistent work, and what producers called the “short stick,” when dealers 
purposefully undervalued a haul of wood, or a “cord.”36  
 GROW activists had thus landed on an industry in which, since the 1930s, white workers 
were either vehemently dedicated to segregation or essentially powerless against their employers. 
Furthermore, despite the history of unionization at Masonite, in 1954 Mississippi joined 
Alabama and twelve other states, primarily Southern and Midwestern, that had already passed 
Right to Work laws after the 1947 passage of the Taft Hartley Act.37 After its passage, employers 
could not require union membership or non-membership as the basis of employment. The law 
resulted in a significant decrease in labor union membership. “While the law has not destroyed 
organized labor in Mississippi as its sponsors has [sic] hoped,” Claude Ramsey, Mississippi 
AFL-CIO President, explained in 1970, “it has hampered our efforts in a number of ways.”38 
                                                           
33 Greenhaw, “Woodcutter’s Organize,” 19; Conner Bailey et al., “Segmented Labor Markets in Alabama’s Pulp and 
Paper Industry,” Rural Sociology 61, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 475-496.   
34 Roy Reed, “Violence and Bruising Labor Plague Cutters of Pulpwood,” The New York Times, June 30, 1974, 26. 
35 Mike Higson, “Politics of Paper,” The Southern Patriot, October 1969, 4; Boyd, The Slain Wood, 73. 
36 Greenhaw, “Woodcutter’s Organize,” 19. 
37 Letter from J.D. Jolly to Mr. J. L. Baughman, 5 June, 1961, Box 9, Folder 5443 Laurel, MS, IWA Southern States 
Records, GSU.  
38 Speech by Claude Ramsey to Kentucky State AFL-CIO Convention, 7 October 1970, Box 2138, Folder 5, MS 
AFL-CIO Records, 1947-1986, GSU. 
 
 13 
Fortunately, those interested in conducting anti-racist organizing and developing interracial 
class-consciousness were armed with a number of new skills, laws, and connections after the 
classical civil rights movement. 
… 
 By the late-1960s, the Laurel IWA Local was mired in what GROW activists called a 
“crisis situation.”39 Officially beginning in April of 1967 when a union shop steward was fired, 
the strike commenced in response to the Masonite Corporation’s plans to reorganize and 
automate the hardboard factory. For at least two decades, the Local had successfully pushed the 
company to accept its terms through similar strikes.40 So, in 1967, they again organized a strike, 
blocking the plant’s entrance with their picket lines and prompting the company to hire private 
guards. The Mississippi Supreme Court, at the behest of the corporation, granted an injunction 
against the Local. After this, it was illegal for the IWA International to recognize the strike. So, 
the Local workers continued to picket in their own wildcat strike. Tensions rose, and the 
combination of private security and militant strikers resulted in the shooting death of a security 
guard that August.41  
The death of Masonite’s hired security guard did not temper the strike. Considering their 
history of victories against the company, the Local expected to be successful. Yet, “one fact had 
changed since 1964,” explained SCEF’s monthly newspaper The Southern Patriot to its roughly 
17,500 readers. “This was the growing number and strength of black workers and the efforts of 
                                                           
39 Bob and Dorothy Zellner, “Grass Roots Organizing Work: A Program for the White South.” 
40 Notes for IWA regional meeting, 21 July, 1951, Box 9, Folder 5443 Laurel, MS, IWA Southern States records, 
1940-1980, GSU. 
41 “Guard is Slain in Mississippi Labor Strife,” Chicago Tribune, August 15, 1967, A10. 
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the company to manipulate these employees.”42 This newfound strength among black workers 
would prove fatal for Local 5-443’s 1967 strike.  
 After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, civil rights organizations in 
Mississippi—as well as individual black workers—pushed for access to jobs from which they 
were previously excluded, as well as equal union membership. As Mississippi NAACP President 
Aaron Henry explained in a telegram to MS AFL-CIO President Claude Ramsey in April 1966 
about an instance of discrimination, any form of employment segregation was deemed 
“intolerable in light of the present day trends in equal employment.”43 Despite Henry’s 
incredulity at one worker’s difficulties after the CRA was passed, the transition towards 
workplace integration was not smooth.  
 White workers and community members violently pushed back against integration and 
equal employment policies. Workplace integration threatened not only white dominance in 
preferred jobs, but also the social and political hierarchies that permeated Southern communities, 
and a number of labor unions had strong ties to the Ku Klux Klan. White workers (insightfully) 
reasoned, explains Boyd, that “If blacks began to move up the occupational ladder, they would 
gain an economic base for new political assertiveness.”44 While Local 5-443’s union leadership 
approved Masonite’s job placement non-discrimination policy relatively quickly, the Klan in 
Laurel made their position against integration violently apparent. In 1965, one union officer was 
                                                           
42 Analavage, “Black and white Divided,” 4. 
43 Aaron Henry to Claude Ramsey, 9 April 1966, Box 2206 Folder 11, MS AFL-CIO records, GSU. For more on 
how the Civil Rights Act transformed the legal infrastructure of the American workplace and allowed all Americans 
–including women, African-Americans, and Latino immigrants –to push for access to the level of United States 
citizenship available only to wage-earning bread-winners, see Nancy MacLean, Freedom is Not Enough: The 
Opening of the American Workplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).  
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attacked and beaten by the Ku Klux Klan on his way home from a union meeting in which, 
newspaper reports explained, “His union and the management of a plant had just agreed on 
integration of the work force.”45 The union did not expect this to be the last attack on its 
membership for the controversial policy. After the mugging, union leaders advised members to 
“arm themselves against a future occurrence (of violence).”46  
Before 1964, black workers at Masonite’s Laurel plant had been organized as an all-black 
sub-local. Laurel, with a population of approximately 25,000, was 37 percent black.47 Partly as a 
result of the predominantly white worker population and segregation in the paper industry, the 
black sub-local was smaller and had little say in union affairs. After the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act, pressure from the IWA international forced the union to integrate, leaving seventy-
five percent of the newly integrated union white and only twenty-five percent black. During the 
first union elections post integration, none of the black candidates up for leadership in Local 5-
443 were elected by the white majority. As a result, according the Local’s white president, J.D. 
Jolly, black members distanced themselves from the union and did not attempt to run again.48 
Jolly felt that the elections alienated black union members and ultimately weakened the Local’s 
power against the corporation. “If some of our colored members hadn’t broken this strike and 
gone back to work,” he suggested, “this strike would be over” with a union victory.49 The power 
of the black workers had become apparent to both the corporation, which hoped to use them to 
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break the strike, and to their co-union members. After the bitter integration process, black 
employees had ample reason to side with their employer over their white co-workers. Nearing 
the end of an unsuccessful strike, white workers were ready for outside help, even if it meant 
foregoing their discrimination against black union members.  
 In the 1960s and 1970s, white workers across the South began to recognize that they could 
no longer rely on the favor of racial discrimination. The prospect of an alliance between 
employers and black workers was particularly threatening. As the Southern Patriot explained: 
“because of the new strength of black people and their movement for freedom, employers can no 
longer keep them down. So the employers now try to convince black workers that they will do 
better by going along with management rather than with the white workers”50 The grassroots 
organizing capacity of the local black population was also impossible to miss. Historian Wesley 
C. Hogan has described the grassroots organizing by SNCC, CORE, and COFO that had defined 
the Mississippi civil rights movement as a “declaration of independence” for the African-
American freedom struggle that “shattered” three-hundred-year-old “rituals of a racial caste 
system.”51 So, even after the massive civil rights infrastructure of the Mississippi Freedom 
Summer was combating “battle fatigue” in the mid to late 1960s, local black citizens continued 
to mobilize.52 When white supremacists in 1967 bombed the Laurel home of a local black civil 
rights leader for his voter registration organizing and for “working with white leaders to promote 
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harmony between the races,” two hundred people, “mostly Negroes,” marched onto city hall to 
protest.53  
 The racially divided Local 5-443 was not alone in its struggle against the Masonite 
Corporation. Civil rights organizing during the 1960s, and especially SNCC, had created a 
generation of young white activists who, by the late sixties and early seventies, were looking to 
find their place in a fractured movement.54 Moved by both the insistence of their frustrated black 
co-activists and civil rights activism’s general turn towards economic and class issues, these 
stranded activists turned their attention to the white working-class in the South.55 They were 
ready to capitalize on white workers’ new reliance on African-American support and dedicated 
to facilitating interracial alliances. 
 After years organizing with local Mississippians and national black leaders, these activists, 
however alienated by black separatism, were armed with connections that provided inroads into 
local working-class Southern communities like Laurel. Since 1964, civil rights and anti-poverty 
activists were also connected through the infrastructure of War on Poverty and Office of 
Economic Opportunities (OEO) programs.56 So, when Zellner, now on SCEF staff, was looking 
for an opening into Southern white working-class communities, he reached out to other 
Mississippi activists. Veteran black civil rights worker Fannie Lou Hamer, then organizing in her 
home region of the Mississippi Delta, introduced Zellner to her new contacts. The working-class 
white people she had met through a local Head Start program, Zellner explained, “[cared] more 
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about putting food on their table and getting their kids an education than segregation.”57 After 
ingratiating themselves into the family and occupational networks of the white working-class 
community of Mississippi, GROW activists eventually learned of the union struggle in Laurel.  
The desperation of the white members of Local 5-443 seemed a distinctive opportunity to 
demonstrate the “substantial changes” possible “if black and white communities unite.”58 When 
Zellner met with them for the first time to propose they work with GROW, he made it clear that 
he was a veteran of the civil rights movement and SNCC.59 This did not seem to matter to the 
newly disempowered workers, as they had already recognized the necessity of coalition building 
after their strike was weakened by disaffected black members. When asked by GROW staff what 
they saw as a solution to their union’s problems, Local president Jolly responded: “Only thing I 
can see is that we’ve got to form a coalition…White and colored in the local will have to get 
together and come up with some candidates from both races and everybody will have to back 
them. Otherwise this thing will continue to split us.”60 
For the 1967 strike, this ultimately proved true. Black workers, visited by GROW staff, 
expressed their frustrations with the Local’s neglect of them. One black worker who had 
participated in the union’s successful 1964 strikes shared why he was not on board. Referring to 
the earlier 1964 strike, he asked: “What did it get us? Nothing changed; we were still treated like 
second-class citizens, like niggers. Ain’t no Negro union officials. There’s only four black shop 
stewards, and they don’t have authority over whites.” Others expressed similar sentiments, 
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arguing that the union never consulted black members when making decisions, including their 
decision to strike this time. Moreover, a few members suggested that the union was “a den of 
Kluxers.” Jolly, the white union leader, did admit that a few of the members were Klansmen, 
though he alleged that they were not those who controlled the union. Nevertheless, black union 
members did not feel represented by a white union that not only ignored their voices, but also 
harbored members of a segregationist hate group that harassed and murdered African-
Americans.61 
While Jolly admitted only a few members were affiliated with the organization, the Klan 
was a powerful force in Laurel. The city was the home of Samuel Bowers, organizer and 
Imperial Wizard of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, which broke off from the original 
Klan in 1964. The Laurel-based group terrorized civil rights activists in Jones County and across 
the state in order to smother the civil rights momentum brought by SNCC and COFO that year. 
Among countless other acts of terror, the White Knights were responsible for the 1964 murders 
of Freedom Summer activists Chaney, Schwerner, and Goodman, and the 1966 murder of local 
Hattiesburg activist Vernon Dahmer, whose home was firebombed as retribution for his voter 
registration activism.62 Thus, accusations against white union members of Klan affiliation were 
both serious and likely true.  
The city’s history of Klan activity was not the only source of racial division within the 
union. According to white union members, Masonite had intentionally exacerbated racial 
tensions by integrating facilities and promoting black workers to preferred jobs. Black union 
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members were indeed disproportionately represented among strikebreakers.63 In the end, without 
the support of black members, the 1967 strike was broken once a deal was struck between the 
International and Masonite. The strike officially ended after the Local was placed under 
trusteeship, rendering all of its property, assets, and finances under the control of the 
International. The International president allegedly intended to “save as many jobs and as many 
benefits as possible under the circumstances.”64 However, the prospects were tenuous for the 
over 600 men still on strike when the agreement was made. Ultimately, many of the most 
militant laborers were not rehired.  
Yet, what the union members described as a “sweetheart deal” laid the ground for the 
Local to respond to both the corporation and their International.65 This time, realizing that racial 
discord had spelt the end of this strike, they would put more effort into an inclusive, interracial 
strategy.  
Once the strike was broken, white members of Local 5-443 were forced by the strike’s 
failure to confront the fact that it was their discrimination and unwillingness to incorporate black 
leadership that had lost them black workers’ loyalty and, ultimately, the strike. This was crucial 
because, as GROW staff explained to white union members, they would have to be the ones to 
forge a coalition. “Blacks have said they will not initiate any reconciliation because they feel 
they have been betrayed too many times in the past,” GROW staffers explained. “Therefore, 
whites will have to make the first move. Unity remains the working men’s only protection; 
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otherwise they will continue to be the victims.”66 If race relations were going to change within 
the Local, it had become clear to everyone involved that they must be changed by the white 
union members.  
The 1967 strike was also a significant step in building trust between white activists and 
white workers. Zellner, who had been beaten and jailed numerous times by white Southerners 
during his work with SNCC, explained: 
I’ve been a stereotype to them—one of those vicious civil-rights workers who the 
people who were running the South had convinced them were upsetting their ‘way 
of life.’ I certainly had a stereotype of them—that they were people waiting on 
dark roads to kill me, and many of them were.67  
 
Despite this, Zellner and others had committed themselves to the Local’s battle against Masonite 
and, more importantly, to convincing these white workers that their discriminatory practices 
against black union members hurt them too. 
In September of 1968, nine months after the union had been put into a trusteeship, a 
group of black and white members of Local 5-443 clustered together in a field just outside of the 
Jones County line. As a result of the trusteeship, the local had been thrown out of their union hall 
and the field became the site of their weekly meetings. Despite preexisting racial tensions, union 
members countered with a determinedly unified front. After consultation with attorney and 
SCEF vice-president, Jack Peebles, the group voted unanimously to take legal action against 
both Masonite and the IWA International. They filed respective National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) charges of discriminatory rehiring and interference in the Local’s internal affairs.68  
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Since its defeat the previous winter, the Local had undergone structural changes to avoid 
a repeat of the company’s successful recruitment of black strikebreakers from within the union. 
Recognizing the role of African Americans in breaking the strike against Masonite, the Local 
finally incorporated their black coworkers into union leadership. To start, members established 
an interracial committee of two black and three white leaders for the purpose of “[including] all 
workers in deliberations.”69 Per GROW’s suggestion, white members initiated the reconciliation.  
In response to rumors that Masonite was planning a “smear campaign” against GROW, 
the union defended not only individual GROW activists but their civil rights work as well. “Bob 
Zellner, Jack Minnis, Mike Higson and Bob Analavage and the rest of them,” read a union leaflet 
defending the strike and GROW organizers assisting it, “have been working for years to try to 
help black men in the South gather the strength to stand shoulder to shoulder with their white 
brothers in the general struggle of working men against companies like Masonite.”70 Two years 
before, the Local had been successfully aggravated by the integration of facilities and the 
promotion of black workers.  Now, the union’s stance—at least its public one—was supportive 
of civil rights workers and their efforts. As members carried on their legal battle against the 
corporation and the IWA, both of which denied the Local’s charges and filed actions against it, 
they were determined that the company would not again “set white workers against blacks.”71  
The legal battle against Masonite also incorporated efforts to build racial unity. In 1970, 
as they awaited a response from the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, the Local petitioned the 
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Department of Justice to respond to their grievances.72 They charged local, county, and state 
officials with “harassing Masonite workers by black-listing, arrests, and beatings, and by falsely 
accusing white union members of affiliation with the Ku Klux Klan.” 73 In a show of solidarity, 
the Local also protested racial and gender bias, charging the company with “discrimination 
against black and women workers, pollution of air and water, hazardous working conditions, and 
falsifying safety records.”74 Discontented current and former Masonite employees also 
established the “Committee for Better Union Leadership.”75 The interracial group was dedicated 
to supporting the over 200 fired Masonite employees who struggled to find other work and 
publicizing the increasingly dangerous working conditions at Masonite. 
The Local’s commitment to interracial coalition building carried over into local politics. 
In 1969, members established a “Committee for Working People’s Government,” dedicated to 
putting up both white and black candidates to “gain control over the machinery of the 
government” in Laurel.76 Specifically, the Committee established a local political campaign to 
elect members of “their own ranks” to mayor and two city commissioner roles.77 In addition to 
vying for the reluctant yet critical support of black union members, the white members of Local 
5-443 also made significant efforts to include them in their political endeavors to enter the 
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Mississippi power structure. This was both symbolically and strategically significant for the 
Laurel campaign.  
The union’s foray into Laurel politics also exemplified a broader appreciation for the 
emergent power of newly enfranchised black voters across the South. After the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act, the number of registered black voters in Mississippi rose from 28,500 (6.7% 
of the voting age population) in 1960 to over 181,000 (59.8%) by September of 1967. By 1972, 
there were nearly 240,000 new black registrants.78 Newspapers broadcast the surge in registered 
black voters, and partisan organizations immediately took note. “In Mississippi,” announced one 
Memphis paper in April 1966, “122,000 Negroes are reported on the voting rolls compared with 
35,000 last August.”79 Organizations like the Mississippi NAACP were dedicated to maintaining 
the increase in black voters. Aaron Henry lauded at the organization’s state conference in 
November 1966 that “We have gone from 20,000 Negroes, registered in 1965 to 170,000 in 
1966. As good as this advancement appears we must hurridly [sic] understand that there are still 
more than 280,000 Negroes still unregistered.”80 In Jackson, black Mississippi political leaders 
established a political action committee to “channel the growing Negro vote for the 1967 
elections.”81 
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 Charles Evers, the gubernatorial candidate who spoke at the Jones County courthouse in 
1970, was enmeshed in this discussion of black voting power and a leader in the effort to corral 
black voters.82 More interested in mobilizing support for those he considered “electable” 
candidates, though, Evers was not necessarily dedicated to getting black candidates in office.83 
One of his triumphs, according to infamous syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert 
Novak, was successfully building black majorities in three Mississippi counties in 1966 for “hard 
line racist” Prentiss Walker running against “national symbol of Jim Crow”—and ultimate 
electee—James Eastland.84  
 Meanwhile, SNCC established an independent black political party in Alabama in the same 
year, mobilizing black voters to place black people into elected office.85 Fierce critics of SNCC, 
Evans and Novak suggested that, unlike with Evers’ efforts, “the plurality of Negro voters was 
squandered as white segregationist candidates on the Democratic ticket defeated the all-Negro 
slate of SNICKS Black Panther Party.”86 However, local and legislative white backlash against 
the Voting Rights Act and black political organizing demonstrate that white people in the Deep 
South did not see black candidates as a naïve, elusive threat to their hold on local politics. SNCC 
and the all-black political organizing of the Lowndes County Freedom Party in Alabama deeply 
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threatened white locals, who responded with violent reprisals and voter fraud.87 In Mississippi, 
the 1966 state legislature passed a slew of laws in a fervent effort to effectively dilute the 
mounting black vote and impede black political candidacy.88 
 As white politicians were working to re-disenfranchise black voters, the Mississippi AFL-
CIO desperately worked to sway the new black votes to their causes. Particularly in the decade 
after the state’s Right to Work legislation made unionization far more difficult, the AFL-CIO 
was trying hard to wrangle as much political power as possible.89 Mississippi AFL-CIO president 
Claude Ramsey made sure the organization was associated with civil and voting rights. In a letter 
sent to Mississippi leaders invited to participate in a black voter registration drive, MS NAACP 
president Aaron Henry acknowledged the AFL-CIO’s contributions to the NAACP’s voter 
registration efforts. “I want, here and now,” he wrote, “to acknowledge the support and 
assistance of Mr. Claude Ramsey and Mr. Tom Knight of the Mississippi State AFL-CIO who 
have been most helpful in getting the National Labor Leadership assistance in this brave and 
vital undertaking” of financing a 1966 NAACP voter registration campaign.90 Henry sent one of 
these letters to Ramsey himself, with a handwritten note assuring him that the meeting and 
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invitation would serve as “evidence of [his] involvement.”91 Ramsey made sure he was seen and 
heard by the African-American community as an advocate for voter education and civil rights by 
speaking at local NAACP branch meetings, organizing AFL-CIO voter registration programs, 
and notifying the Department of Justice of voting rights infringements.92 
Thus, the Laurel Local’s “Committee for Working People’s Government” was 
representative of a regional effort to attract (or, alternatively, disfranchise) previously neglected 
black voters. While predominantly made up of white union members, the group was nonetheless 
interested in building an interracial coalition of candidates and voters.93 This was not easy, 
considering the history of Laurel and union politics. Some of the black candidates were 
intimidated by their employers into backing out of their candidacy, such as one ex-Masonite 
worker whose new janitorial position at a white church was threatened. Moreover, despite 
running on a platform demanding the equal treatment of black and white citizens of Laurel, the 
mayoral candidate, Herbert Ishee, had “a reputation there of being a former Klansmen.”94 In an 
attempt to convince voters of his commitment to antidiscrimination, Ishee and his campaign 
canvassed the black community.95 Regardless of how black voters responded—not strongly 
                                                           
91 Aaron Henry to Claude Ramsey, 18 April 1966, MS AFL-CIO Records. 
92 Gilbert R. Mason to Claude Ramsey, 24 November 1967, Box 2206, Folder 13, MS AFL-CIO records, GSU; 
Speech by Claude Ramsey to Kentucky state AFL-CIO convention, 7 October 1970, Box 2138, Folder 5, MS AFL-
CIO records, GSU; Henry M. Aronson to Robert Owen, 1 April 1966, Box 2206., Folder 11, MS AFL-CIO records, 
GSU.   
93 Analavage, “Power Structure,” 8. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
 
 28 
enough to win—white workers were striving to gain their support and demonstrate their 
solidarity with Laurel’s black community.96 
The Committee for Working People’s Government’s determined effort to include the 
black Laurel community reflects the dramatic changes that had taken place since the dissolution 
of Jim Crow. It was the integration of the Local 5-443 that made white workers far more 
susceptible—and in turn responsive—to black workers. GROW activists’ experience organizing 
the black community with SNCC in the 1960s prepared them to catalyze this self-help electoral 
campaign. And finally, the enfranchisement of over one hundred thousand black voters in 
Mississippi is what made it at all sensible for a white mayoral candidate to run on an anti-
discrimination platform. GROW’s efforts to capitalize on these changes, though, would soon 
expand beyond Local 5-443 and Laurel, Mississippi.  
… 
While working in Laurel with Local 5-443, GROW organizers also connected with 
independently striking pulpwood cutters. Pulpwood cutters (also referred to as pulpwood haulers 
or producers) worked in small teams to cut, fell, and haul pulpwood to be delivered to a “dealer,” 
who worked as a liaison between mill and producers. While company crews and independent 
producers also supplied wood to mills, the majority of it was collected through a tiered dealer 
system. Forestry scholars John. C. Bliss and Warren A. Flick explained: 
Each week, [the dealer] receives a wood order from the mill and maintains contact with 
the mill representatives concerning the kind of wood needed, expected delivery times, 
price computations, problems with producers, and so on. To fill the wood order, he meets 
with landowners and persuades them to sell him the right to cut timber from their land. 
Finally, he contracts with independent wood producers who then recruit laborers to cut 
the trees and haul them to railroad landings or to the mill.97 
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The teams of laborers—usually family members, “informal partners or joint relatives, part-time 
helpers”—most often worked with “nothing more than a chain saw and a truck.” The work done 
by pulpwood haulers was seen as socially inferior to that of loggers, who often used heavy 
equipment and engineering systems. Most woodcutters descended from long lines of parents and 
grandparents who also labored in the same forests, hauling wood for mills or tapping trees for 
turpentine.98 
 In 1968, a group of cutters in southern Alabama organically came together to protest 
price disparities between the Deep South state and Georgia. They formed the Alabama Pulpwood 
Producers’ Association, which spread and became the GPA.99 This producer association yielded 
GROW’s most successful interracial organizing effort, ultimately winning major concessions 
from paper and wood processing companies, as well as fomenting an exceptional amount of 
interracial unity and black leadership. In a 1971 staff memo, SCEF Executive Director Anne 
Braden lauded the accomplishments as monumental. “I think it can be considered the most 
important thing that has happened in the South in a long time,” she suggested. “Material support 
is crucial, because probably the only way [the strikers] can be beaten is to be starved out.100 
As the organization grew, Simmons was determined that the precarious alliance between 
white and black pulpwood cutters would not be defeated.101 Like the white leaders of the Local 
5-443 strike in 1967, Simmons recognized the growing strength of the black community, 
explaining that “If you get a good bunch of colored people and they have a good leader, you got 
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yourself a pretty strong bunch.”102 The association’s recruitment efforts capitalized on the 
exclusion of black pulpwood producers from small increases in wood prices conceded over the 
previous few years. While some white workers left meetings upon realizing that it was an 
interracial group, the GPA maintained its commitment to racial unity. By 1970, half of its elected 
board of representatives were black, as was 60 percent of its membership.103  
 Now intimately engaged in the Southern wood processing world, GROW activists had 
ample ways to connect with the woodcutters’ struggle. News of the GROW activists in Laurel 
had spread to other white workers in the South, prompting GPA founder James Simmons to 
reach out for their assistance.104 It is likely too, that GROW’s connection with SNCC gave the 
group an appreciation of the workers’ struggle in Alabama. In 1965, in response to plans by the 
Hammerhill Paper Company to build a plant outside of Selma after the violence against civil 
rights protesters, SNCC orchestrated an extensive, nationwide boycott of the company.105 It is 
possible that their familiarity with the paper industry in Alabama made it easier for GROW to 
quickly involve themselves when the independent group of woodcutters in the state decided to 
strike.  
 With the help of GROW activists, the GPA expanded quickly in the early 1970s. After 
realizing that Georgia cutters earned over $3 more than he was getting for a “cord,” or 
approximately 5,500 pounds of wood, Simmons connected with cutters in Mobile to organize a 
statewide strike, which for the haulers meant “refusing to cut, load, or haul pulpwood for any 
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dealer or company.”106 By the autumn of 1971, the GPA had expanded across Alabama and into 
Mississippi, and including approximately 6,000 producers. GPA members and GROW activists 
had organized “at least” thirty-five chapters in Mississippi, including one in Laurel, and more in 
Eastern Alabama. In October of 1971, Braden shared that, according to her reports from the 
“Deep South” staff (another term used to refer to the GROW project), the GPA and their strike 
against a drop in unit prices for pulpwood now involved “thousands of cutters, at least five big 
paper companies, and lumber yards throughout Southern Mississippi.”107 This 1971 interracial 
woodcutters strike eventually drew the attention of the rest of the nation.108  
As in the rest of Mississippi and Alabama, Laurel-area pulpwood cutters faced deep price 
cuts. In late Spring of 1971, Masonite lowered piece rates by changing their method of weighing 
wood. One unit, formerly around 5,500 pounds, was now up to 7,100.109 In response, the Laurel 
chapter of the GPA, with support from GROW and in solidarity with the Alabama strikers, 
organized a strike against the Corporation on September 1 and refused to deliver their wood.110 
By November, the strike in Mississippi had spread from 200 to 3,500 men, evenly divided 
between black and white workers.”111 The company, which used to receive about 250 loads of 
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wood per day, was getting only about fifty after the strike began. By December, the group 
reached a settlement with Masonite that raised their pay to the original level.112  
In addition to the “unprecedented degree of racial unity” that characterized the strike, 
GROW organizers also reported a change in strikers’ racial attitudes. “The issue of racism has 
not been clearly resolved,” one GROW staffer explained, but “throughout consistent class 
struggle and contact with the mass of people in the rural South, racism has been somewhat 
neutralized.”113 Braden was even more enthusiastic, pointing out the historical context of the 
region in which they were organizing an interracial group of workers: 
   I think everybody should be aware of the significant breakthroughs that are being 
made in this work. The place where I went with Bob [Zellner] to a meeting the 
other night was Popularville, Miss. That’s where Charles Mack Parker was 
dragged out of the jail a lynched in the 1950s -one of the worst things of this kind 
in recent decades—and it’s been one of the real hell-holes of Mississippi. All of 
the woodcutters there the night I went were black—but both black and white have 
been at previous meetings and they will be again. This, to me, is a miracle in 
itself—in Popularville, Miss. This same thing can be said about many of the other 
places where these groups are being organized. Next week there will be a meeting 
at the courthouse in Philadelphia, Miss.—in Neshoba County. I think that speaks 
for itself.114  
 
This change in attitudes materialized into a change in voting patterns. Black gubernatorial 
candidate Charles Evers claimed ten percent of the white vote in the strike’s strongest 
counties.115  
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Once Evers became involved, the GPA’s interracial unity drew local and national media 
attention. The Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and New York Times published articles 
about the white GPA members’ support of Charles Evers’ campaign.116 The two hundred “whites 
and blacks who gathered here in the Jones County Courthouse the other night should be mortal 
enemies,” wrote one Washington Post reporter. “But this year they are allies, and at least for the 
moment the old Southern dream of ‘black and white together’ is thriving…”117 Black 
newspapers such as the Baltimore Afro-American and the Chicago Defender reported similar 
sentiments.118 The Los Angeles Times published an article with the subtitle “NAACP AIDS 
‘REDNECKS,’” noting “the cooperation of poor whites and poor blacks in a strike led by whites 
and their willingness to accept openly the help of black Civil Rights organizations and the radical 
Southern Conference Education Fund.”119  
Meanwhile, local newspapers highlighted the alleged Communist ties of the SCEF 
workers. “Charges of communist affiliation—which have not been publicly denied by those 
involved—have been levied against at least one worker of an organization working with the 
Gulfcoast Pulpwood Association,” reported the Laurel Leader-Call, a local daily newspaper 
publishing a series of articles on the strike.120 The interracial organizing that had characterized 
the GPA’s strike not only succeeded in forcing the Masonite Corporation to raise its prices for 
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wood. It also shocked the nation, disturbed local white Southern communities, and, as will later 
be shown, inspired other workers throughout the South. In Laurel and around the country, the 
strike and its civil rights ties had not gone unnoticed. 
… 
 SCEF’s institutional support of the GPA’s efforts was critical to the strike’s effectiveness. 
“You should all know that we have made certain commitments to this movement,” Braden 
advised in a SCEF staff report from March of 1971.121 In addition to providing full-time 
organizers to assist the strikers’ expansion across the state and into Mississippi, SCEF found and 
paid for the lawyer who represented the strikers. Moreover, SCEF allowed the GPA to use its 
printer to develop a monthly newsletter to unify the geographically disparate workers.  
 Much of the support SCEF was able to offer came from connections made and resources 
gathered during the 1950s and 1960s civil rights movement. For example, SCEF orchestrated a 
national fundraising campaign for the GPA in 1971, channeling essential money to strikers’ 
families while they remained out of work for over six months. The fundraiser mailing list that 
SCEF offered to the GPA was largely from SNCC contacts developed in the 1960s.122 Thanks to 
this shared resource developed during the classical civil rights movement, by October 1971, 
SCEF’s fundraising infrastructure had raised “over $5,000 for them in big hunks—plus” smaller 
donations from individuals who had been contacted through direct mail campaigns.123 
Organizing fundraisers and pledging groups to consistently donate to the strikers, SCEF 
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committed donors from as far away as Chicago.124 Combining SCEF’s funds with the nearly 
$10,000 from Charles Evers’ NAACP Emergency Relief Fund kept the strike alive.125  
 Many of SCEF’s personnel also brought invaluable organizing experience from the 
classical movement. In addition to recruiting former white SNCC members, SCEF’s board sat 
prominent civil rights activists such as Fred Shuttlesworth and Mojeska Simpkins, respective 
representatives of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the NAACP. Each provided 
Southern organizing knowledge and resources to SCEF’s projects.126  
  The relationship between the GPA and SCEF, though, was mutually beneficial. Both 
before and after the triumph of the 1971 strike, SCEF’s claim to the GPA was one of its biggest 
causes for attracting support to the organization. Its 1970 “Report to Stockholders” summarized 
the GROW project in Laurel and the GPA as highlights of its work. “Meantime,” the report wrote 
to those they hoped would continue providing financial support, “our Deep South staff is 
continuing to help working white and black people build toward coalitions in Laurel, Miss.—the 
heart of Klan country—while at the same time holding workshops for people doing similar grass-
roots organizing in Alabama and Jackson, Miss.”127 In a 1971 fundraising tour of SCEF 
organizers, GPA President James Simmons was on the agenda as a “surprise” for donors.128  Two 
years later, Braden reported to her board that the woodcutters strike of the GPA was SCEF’s “the 
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most successful labor support organizationally….On the whole, we have moved faster and better 
on this strike than on any other labor issue.”129 The GPA had generated a national donor base for 
SCEF that was invested in coalition building between white and black working-class 
communities.  
 Finally, the interracial unity generated impressive publicity. Roy Reed, the reporter who 
covered the Evers campaign meeting at the 1971 Jones County courtroom, consistently reported 
on the actions and plight of the pulpwood producers in Mississippi. Though he didn’t name 
SCEF as the group providing the most organizational support to the Association, the attention the 
GPA received undoubtedly bolstered SCEF’s own outreach.130 
… 
 After the successful 1971 strike against wood price reductions, the GPA underwent another 
battle beginning in 1973. This time, their very existence was under legal threat. Beginning in 
September of that year, the woodcutters went on strike yet again, demanding higher prices for the 
wood they produced for Alabama and Mississippi paper plants. Five days into the strike, they 
started picketing the Scott Paper and International Paper plants.131 Before, companies silenced 
these uprisings by offering white cutters increased wood prices.132 But times had changed. No 
longer able to quietly suppress the producers through racial division, the companies sued them 
instead. Woodcutters, the companies argued, were violating antitrust laws by joining together to 
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argue for higher wages. Instead of company employees, they should be viewed as independent 
contractors and, therefore, kept from legally unionizing. This battle played out in the federal, 
state, and circuit courts, culminating on March 18, 1974 in the United States Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals case, Scott Paper Company v. Gulf Coast Pulpwood Association.133  
 SCEF hastened to protect its most successful program. A letter from SCEF staff member 
Fred Ansley to the organization’s supporters reported the crisis and SCEF’s efforts to “defend the 
legal fight for woodhaulers to organize and strike.”134 As part of these efforts, SCEF organized 
benefit dinners, concerts, and even Christmas parties. A benefit concert in Tallahassee, for 
example, raised $300. A Louisville viewing party of the documentary film on Mexican-American 
strikers in a New Mexico zinc mine, “Salt of the Earth,” raised $375. A Christmas party in the 
same city collected wrapped Christmas gifts for the woodcutters’ children. Moreover, Ansley 
explained, since “winter is the slack season for wood hauling,” the woodcutters were organizing 
a travelling speaker bureau to inform interested parties of their situation.135 The new President 
and Vice President of the GPA, Delbert Carney, a whiter worker from Chatom Alabama, and 
C.D. Kimbrough, a black reverend from Mobile, were trying to generate support within 
Alabama. All along, “the SCEF Office in Louisville [was] also continuing to aid the GPA in what 
ways [it] can, and to help supporters keep in touch with each other and with the GPA.”136  
 After the woodcutters had faced five legal battles against multiple paper and timber 
companies, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans ruled in their 
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favor for their right to unionize. “The economic relationship between the wood producers and the 
wood dealers,” explained the judge, “is more like that between a piece-work employee and his 
employer than that of an independent contractor.”137 This was a decisive win for producers. As 
Boyd explains, this ruling “exploded the myth of the ‘independent’ pulpwood producer, pointing 
to the massive asymmetries of power that existed in the southern wood procurement system.” 
According to a Yale Industrial Forestry Seminar in 1974, this ruling had the potential to set the 
stage for collective bargaining in the pulpwood industry.138 
 The 1973 strike also renewed the GPA’s national media spotlight. In a highly sympathetic 
piece, Roy Reed, the apparent beat reporter for the GPA and Southern pulpwood industry, 
narrated the struggles of pulpwood cutters across the Deep South. “Assaults on the body and the 
mind are far from rare in the Southern pulpwood country,” he explained in a description of a day 
on the job for a set of father and son woodcutters. “They go hand in hand with the straining, 
bruising labor —labor that a few like Mr. Brown have decided is sold too cheap.”139  
… 
 The interracial nature of the GPA did not come without conflict. For decades, these 
pulpwood cutters had been racially divided by their industry and the social and legal apparatus of 
Jim Crow, and this dark history re-emerged after the 1971 strike.140 Simmons, members claimed, 
“repeatedly stated that blacks could not play a leadership role, that they were not smart enough, 
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and they would scare off whites.”141 He also tried to make himself lifelong chairman. In 
response, members collectively repudiated his leadership, culminating in a 1972 vote at the 
GPA’s Mississippi state convention. The outcome was a wholehearted “rejection of the 
leadership of James Simmons.”142 In his place, they elected “an interracial group of new officers 
including three blacks and three whites,” with Fred Walters, a black woodcutter, as the new GPA 
president.143 
 Nationwide supporters of the GPA—both white and black—remained enthusiastic. Despite 
the racism which in part prompted the election, the Baltimore Afro-American and Chicago 
Defender reminded readers that “it was the high degree of unity among black and white 
woodcutters that many people believe was the key to the historic victory in the strike last fall.”144 
Moreover, the GPA stayed active for at least another seven years, even while the disgruntled 
Simmons continued to “actively red-bait, race-bait, [and] intimidate” the organization.145 
Walters, voted in with a “unanimous vote of confidence,” remained president for the remainder 
of the decade.146 
 According to one woodcutter in 1980, the GPA was the first association that really got 
woodcutters to believe in the possibility of organization. “It has helped a great deal," said black 
woodcutter Ralph Lee Johnson in 1980 of the GPA, while acknowledging that the economic 
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situation for the woodcutter was still grim. “The leadership has continued to function, we have 
won several big lawsuits.”147 Eventually, other woodcutter associations, inspired by the GPA, 
arose across the Deep South. They made sure to not infringe on the GPA’s jurisdiction. In 1978, 
woodcutters north of Jackson, Mississippi formed the Southern Woodcutters Assistance Project 
(SWAP). Beginning as a supply cooperative called the United Woodcutters Association, the 
group would go on to establish a credit union, successfully push for a “Fair Pulpwood Scaling 
Practices Board,” and form a legal non-profit organization to support members.148  
 Outside the pulpwood industry, GROW activists used their connection with the 
woodcutters, many of whom had wives in the Laurel poultry industry, to begin organizing mostly 
women poultry plant workers.149 This organizing also proved successful, as one GROW staff 
report from 1973 detailed: 
   One of the poultry plants where the MPWU [Mississippi Poultry Workers Union] 
is organized had just held a 100 per cent work stoppage. The stoppage was 
supposed to be for three minutes, but the workers left for the day and the plant did 
not reopen. [SCEF organizer] Bates feels that the MPWU will get their best 
contract with that plant.150  
 
Another SCEF staff member, Michael Honey, suggested that the “poultry workers are an 
embarrassment to established unions because they have gone ahead and organized the 
unorganized as many established unions have not.”151 Because of the MPWU’s success, other 
unions, such as the Amalgamated Meatcutters, conducted what SCEF called “raids” of the 
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poultry workers union to organize their own plants.152 The interracial organizing that the black 
and white working class of Laurel initiated, with GROW, had been successful, and others were 
inspired.153 
… 
 While SCEF’s Deep South labor organizing project lasted until approximately 1980, most 
of the momentum surrounding its work in the Southern wood processing industry lasted between 
1967 and 1973.154 Conflict within SCEF, economic fluctuations, and the mechanization of the 
industry made labor organizing in Southern woods processing increasingly more challenging. 
 After 1973, the GPA no longer dominated SCEF’s meeting minutes and the GPA all but 
disappeared from national news outlets. “The slots of labor coordinator, etc.,” read one SCEF 
interim committee meeting report from 1974, “were voted in at the same time that the board 
voted to set aside 20% of its budget to be spent for grass roots organizing in the wake of the 
dissolving of the GROW project.”155 As early as 1971, some staff members took their activism to 
other organizations. For example, GROW staffer Steve Martin explained in his letter of 
resignation from SCEF that his “discontent” with his work was not due to disagreement about 
the project and its goals themselves, but of diverging politics and strategy within SCEF.156 
Instead of staying with SCEF, Martin decided to move his work with the GPA to the Selma Inter-
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religious Project. The Project, which was started by a white Episcopalian Bishop in 1965, was 
formed in the aftermath of the Selma to Montgomery March to maintain the presence of “church-
related agencies” in Alabama’s black communities and, similar to SCEF, to “serve in whatever 
bridge capacities may be opening up between Whites and Negroes.”157 According to Martin, it 
also apparently had “access to funds that SCEF [would] never have.”158 Whatever his reasons for 
leaving, Martin’s resignation seems to have precipitated what some members’ of SCEF’s board 
designated “The 1973 Crisis.”159  
 That year, SCEF staff went through a majorly divisive conflict after members of an 
affiliated branch of the Black Panther Party (BPP) in Louisville kidnapped SCEF’s then 
Executive Director, Helen Greever, and her husband. SCEF had been working with the group for 
months, and the two groups regularly clashed over plans (or lack thereof) for local projects and 
the distribution of SCEF’s resources. While the two escaped and no one was hurt, they planned 
to press charges with the police. A couple of months before, Louisville SCEF staff had also made 
a mental inquest warrant against local BPP leader Ben Simmons, after he threatened to kill 
members of SCEF staff, one of whom was his wife. The use of police and the mental institution, 
seen by many members as inherently and violently oppressive of the black community, to resolve 
the issues was extremely controversial.  
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 The fallout greatly divided SCEF staff.160 Members of the Louisville staff were pressured 
out or fired by others in the organization, leading to a number of other resignations from their 
supporters.161 Those who supported the kidnappers called the firings anti-Communist, based on 
the political leanings of Greever and those who supported her. Others in SCEF were highly 
critical of the Louisville SCEF staff, arguing that they were perpetuating the system of white 
supremacy that they claimed to fight. Questions of the racial makeup of the SCEF board and 
staff, Red-baiting, and the direction of leadership dominated meetings for the remainder of 1973. 
Instead of a freak event, the kidnappings seemed to bring to a fore sectarian political and 
personal tensions that had been brewing within the group for a number of years. While SCEF 
remained active until 1985, its programs and membership were in a consistent state of flux since 
at least 1973.162 The GPA, strewn across an intentionally segmented and geographically 
expansive wood region, would have been severely impaired without the full-time support of 
SCEF organizers to help coordinate its efforts.  
 Changes to both the relevant industries also likely slowed unionization of both factory 
workers and pulpwood cutters. In 1975, demand for wood products and, in turn, pulpwood 
decreased significantly in conjunction with the national housing economy and the “slowed 
condition of the worldwide economy, to which paper and paper demand are directly related."163 
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As a result, thousands of loggers were put out of work.164 “Thus,” suggested an industry report, 
“total pulpwood production activities in the woods worsened, with the economic impact upon 
woods workers and local communities and service industries a certain but unmeasured 
reality.”165 Even when the industry recovered the next year, “pulpwood producers did not enjoy 
the same high level of recovery. Pulpwood deliveries…did not attain the pulpwood receipts level 
reached in 1974." According to one international economic report on the forestry and wood 
industries, wood products industry employment in North America in the 1980s dropped again as 
a result of economic recession and industrial restructuring. These changes, concluded the report, 
“took their toll of economic activity and jobs. In Canada and the United States, in particular, 
employment decreased during these years but started to rise again by the mid-1980s.”166 While 
the industry—and even pulpwood receipts—may have recovered within a couple of years of 
cyclical market lulls, the inconsistency in demand for pulpwood and, in turn, for pulpwood 
haulers, would have severely disrupted organizing efforts as well.   
 As producers adjusted to these fluctuations, the industry’s push towards mechanization also 
compelled them to independently invest in expensive mechanized logging equipment that was 
becoming a requirement of the job by the late 1970s and 1980s.167 New machines such as the 
“Busch combine” and the “Beloit harvest” combined the work of cutting, felling, harvesting, and 
bunching the wood.168 However much these machines increased productivity, the variability in 
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weather and mills’ demand for wood made it difficult for loggers to recover the cost of them. 
And the more pulpwood haulers were forced out due to the costs of these machines, the faster 
pulpwood procurement mechanized to make up for the loss of manpower.169 While in reality 
mechanization trapped producers further into debt and dependency, these capital-heavy 
investments made it more difficult to argue that they were sawmill employees deserving of the 
protection of labor laws and unions. Meanwhile, to the chagrin of producer association 
organizers, beginning in the mid-1980s, paper companies expanded their procurement areas by 
building satellite chip mills in less-competitive (and un-unionized) forest in other parts of 
Mississippi and Alabama, as well as in Texas, Tennessee, and Kentucky.170 The combination of 
these conditions posed real logistical challenges to labor organizing.  
 Yet, SCEF maintained ties with the GPA through the late 1970s. In 1976, the SCEF interim 
committee revisited their relationship with the woodcutters association, ultimately deciding that 
it would continue to “build a solidarity between the GPA and SCEF, and that this solidarity 
should be built on a firm political basis” based on their common goal of improving conditions for 
“working people in this country.”171 While they would not support the organization monetarily, 
they agreed to give them their fundraising list, help them develop a fundraising letter, and assist 
in the production of another newsletter to help the organization educate and collect dues from its 
widespread membership. SCEF even decided it would organize training workshops for GPA 
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leaders, so that they themselves could develop the grassroots organizing skills which were used 
to organize them.172  
 Both the GPA and offshoots of the group, such as SWAP, continued to fight on behalf of 
pulpwood cutters. In 1982, the United Woodcutters Association successfully pushed the 
Mississippi Farm Bureau to change its standards for measuring pulpwood. According to one 
organizer and producer, the original method, during which the woodcutter himself was unable to 
see the scale, cost them around $1,500 per year.173 The association had begun pushing for a 
change three years earlier, but it was not until they convinced pulpwood land owners that they 
were losing out in the deal as well that their efforts gained traction. After an endorsement from 
the Mississippi Farm Bureau, on March 8, the Mississippi Fair Pulpwood Scaling and Practices 
Act was passed.174 The next step, according to one of the organizers, was to “organize strikes at 
some wood yards,” as ultimately “the fundamental poverty of the woodcutters is not going to 
change until they are paid more.”175 
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CONCLUSION 
 Over the course of ten plus years, the GROW project harnessed the destruction of Jim 
Crow to initiate interracial labor coalitions across the Deep South. The project was established 
with the purpose of convincing white workers that their racism hurt them too—a focus that kept 
racial cooperation, education, and black leadership at the center of the process. Using these 
strategies, GROW’s most successful undertaking, the GPA, forced powerful paper companies to 
raise their payments to pulpwood producers for wood, legally established the right of producers 
to unionize through the federal courts, and inspired an expansion of producer associations in 
Mississippi that eventually forced the passage of a statewide Fair Pulpwood Scaling and 
Practices Act. Though votes from the interracial producer association did not carry Charles Evers 
to the Mississippi governor’s office in 1971, he won nearly twenty-two percent of the vote across 
the state amidst white intimidation and violence at the polls.176 These successes in interracial 
coalition building offer a complication to the leading historiography on Southern white people’s 
“massive resistance” after the classical movement.177   
 One of the primary reasons this moment of interracial coalition-building in the late 1960s 
and 1970s deserves exploration is because its success and longevity were limited. Working-class, 
interracial coalition building through labor unions is nowhere near the norm in the South (or 
anywhere around the country). Many of the challenges that confronted the GPA represent 
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challenges which confronted Southern labor organizing more generally in the second half of the 
20th century. Changes to the type of jobs available to U.S. workers, optimization of labor costs 
through mechanization, and the progression of labor law in favor of employers have been 
widespread obstacles to union organizing.178 When opportunities for labor organizing decreased, 
so did opportunities for interracial coalition building. In the same way that the post-WWII Red 
Scare disempowered black laborers’ impact on civil rights, the decrease of labor organizing in 
the last half-century has also taken away a demonstrated venue for anti-racist organizing and 
interracial coalition building. 
 As this study of GROW has also attempted to show, though, the framework used to 
understand the “opportunities found and lost” in 1930s and 1940s civil rights unionism does not 
fully answer why the New Right emerged with such gusto, why interracial coalitions do not 
define working-class politics today, and why economic and racial disparities continue to grow. 
Even with its shift in focus towards voter registration and civil rights legislation, the classical 
civil rights movement greatly empowered black workers in the Deep South, especially in their 
relationship to white workers. Black workers were seen as critical to grassroots union organizing, 
were empowered to reject racial discrimination and violence, and mobilized to register and use 
their newly earned voting power. As a result, race relations in working-class organizing changed. 
When one white woman involved in a 1971 interracial labor strike in Durham, North Carolina 
stated, “we’ll have to get together sooner or later. If we can work with [black people], we can 
strike with ‘em. They stick together better than white people. That’s why they’ve been getting 
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ahead,” she was expressing a widespread recognition among white workers that it no longer 
benefited them to distance themselves from their black counterparts.179 
 Acknowledging the new power of black workers after the classical civil rights movement 
also highlights how interracial dynamics shape the outcomes of coalition building, whether in the 
1930s, the 1970s, or today.  The attempts by Masonite to divide its workforce by deliberately 
promoting black workers and “klan-baiting” white unionists demonstrate that employers were 
also very aware of the shift in racial power dynamics in this period.180 By the late 1960s, 
interracial labor coalitions were emerging across the South, in poultry processing, farm 
equipment manufacturing, and textile mills, posing a widespread threat to Southern labor norms 
that extended beyond the wood processing industry.181  
  Historians should take these changes into consideration when contemplating the course of 
20th century working-class and labor-oriented civil rights activism. Interracial union organizing 
functioned very differently in the 1960s compared to the 1930s and 1940s. As a result, backlash 
against interracial organizing and anti-union efforts had to be adjusted as well. How exactly did 
not only companies, but also politicians and policy makers, then, respond to new working-class 
race relations after the civil rights movement of the 1960s? In other words, without Jim Crow to 
racially divide the Southern labor force, how did they ensure that the potential power of united 
labor was kept at bay? Looking more broadly, is there a relationship between United States 
deindustrialization, the development of the sunbelt, and labor mechanization and the elimination 
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of Jim Crow? If so, what is it? How did black and white worker coalitions ultimately renegotiate 
social and workplace relationships? It is my hope that in taking into consideration the way that 
the classical movement impacted interracial working-class dynamics, these types of questions 
will lead to more precise explanations for existing racial and class inequality in the United States, 
and the complex, intimate, and often fraught relationship between the two.  
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